The Problem of Morally-Impossible Evil

Philosophers will say that there is no essential inconsistency in the so-called ‘inconsistent triad’ of the problem of evil: God is good, God is powerful, evil exists. Perhaps they are right, if we are talking about physical or metaphysical necessity. But if we are talking about moral necessity, I think they are wrong.

Solutions to the problem of evil have always been possible; the question is whether and when they are permissible.

Moral Necessity

Most people recognise a difference between the morally possible and the morally impossible. The difference between lying to your friends and raping them is not difficult to understand. Whilst both are morally bad things to do, in one case there might be circumstances in which it is permissible, excusable, or even justifiable, the other would not be permissible or excusable or justifiable under any circumstances: there is no ambiguity about which is which.

We could call this prohibition categorical or absolute. It admits no exceptions, and because of this there are no good reasons, moral or otherwise, to do what should never be done. The impermissible cannot be permitted; the inexcusable cannot be excused; you cannot justify the unjustifiable. These are grammatical statements.

The recognition of the morally impossible is nothing more or less than a recognition of moral limits. Most people have moral limits. Does God?

God’s Moral Limits

We say that God is a good God and not an evil God; we say that God is knowing and not ignorant; we say that God is powerful and not weak. There is little disagreement here. No one seriously defends an evil, ignorant, or weak God.

Does God recognise moral reasons? If no, then it would be difficult to call God ‘knowing’. Even children understand these things; even non-human animals. There are many ways to understand moral reasons, and people will disagree about these things, but how ignorant would you have to be to not recognise any of them?

If God does recognise moral reasons, then is God responsive to these moral reasons? If no, then it would be difficult to call God ‘good’. Moral reasons have a ‘to be doneness’ within them; that is their peculiar nature. Ordinarily this connection between recognition and responsiveness is so strong that it’s the responsiveness that shows our understanding. If I say ‘it’s wrong to beat children’ whilst mercilessly beating a child, the least we could say is that I am confused.

If God is responsive to moral reasons, then does God recognise the difference between the morally possible and the morally impossible? If no, then we have a problem. Because that means that nothing is morally impossible for God and that God has no moral limits. Like an ethically-dubious anti-hero, He will do what He must to get the job done.

Sometimes we revere these anti-heroes, but we do not do so unconditionally. We recognise them as flawed, broken, morally stained. They are meant to be morally-ambiguous figures, and they are mostly fictional. But God is not meant to be either of these.

Moral Ambiguity

We are all familiar with moral ambiguity and we don’t have to look to fiction to find it. We don’t ordinarily incinerate the children of our enemies to preserve the lives of our soldiers. We don’t ordinarily do it again as an intimidation tactic. But this is what happened at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At best this is morally ambiguous; at worst it is something else entirely.

What that example means, for you, will depend on your moral limits. Reflecting on these kinds of examples cannot change anything, but it can teach you about yourself. You can discover your moral limits in these abstract philosophical investigations and with those limits you can carve out the shape of your moral world.

Any theodicy will depict a strange moral world, one in which the suffering of innocents can be used as a means to an end or otherwise compensated by greater goods or the avoidance of worse evils. It is the moral world of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; and of Jimmy Savile, offsetting his child abuse by his charitable contributions. It is not a world that I recognise as moral. But people will disagree about these things.

We must all live within our moral worlds or suffer the consequences. What moral world does God live in? If theodicy is anything to go by, it is a world without limit. It is a world where God permits what cannot be permitted, excuses what cannot be excused, and justifies what cannot be justified: the morally impossible. I would not call that morally good. I am not sure it makes sense to call it ‘moral’ at all.

Moral Tragedy

What if God has no choice? What if He must choose between two morally-impossible options? To allow a child to be abused, say, or revoke the free will of His creatures? Both are absolute violations of moral and logical necessity. It is a forced choice between two things that ought never be done: a ‘Sophie’s choice’.

In such a morally tragic situation, you do what you have to do, but you do not feel good about it. You do it with a heavy heart, fully aware of the wrong that you are doing. You recognise that you are damned if you do and damned if you don’t, but either way you are damned. This is the nature of a moral tragedy: no one escapes unscathed.

In this case God becomes a grief-stricken and guilt-ridden God, a damned God, a God who knows He has done wrong, even if He had no other option. Like any morally-decent person, He would not offer excuses or justifications, and He would not ask or allow anyone else to do so on His behalf. He would seek forgiveness and look to atone. If He does not have this moral responsiveness then He would be callous and insensitive. Not even God would call Himself ‘good’ in either case. This is the problem of morally-impossible evil.

The Morally Impossible

If the morally impossible did not happen then there would be no problem of evil. Or at least there would be nothing but a shallow problem of evil, whinging about trivialities.

But the morally impossible happens. A lot. It happens every day. Anyone who doesn’t see this hasn’t been paying attention. It presents a serious problem for anyone wishing to maintain a theistic set of beliefs that includes the notion of God’s perfect goodness.

A good thing cannot permit the morally impossible without incurring guilt. A guilty thing cannot be considered perfectly good. Therefore, there cannot be a perfectly good thing that permits the morally impossible.

Without a recognition of moral necessity and the limits that come with it, it is easier to solve the problem of evil. But if you recognise the morally impossible and the moral limits that are imposed by it, it is impossible to reconcile this recognition with a notion of God’s perfect goodness. This impossibility – of reconciling belief in a perfect God with a sincere recognition of the terrible evils of the world – is a moral impossibility. This essential inconsistency isn’t grounded in physical or metaphysical necessity but in moral necessity.

Can the problem of evil be solved? Logically: possibly. But morally? Impossible.

Anti-Theodicy, Atheism, Ethics, God, Metaethics, Philosophy of Religion, Religion, The Problem of Evil, Theism, Theodicy