It’s very difficult to stop sceptical theism sliding into a more widespread moral scepticism. Ultimately, this would be morally paralysing. If sceptical theism says that ‘for all we know’, what seems bad is in fact for the best, then how are we to ever judge anything as bad?
For all we know, anything we judge to be bad is not, in fact, bad. And for all we know, everything we judge to be good is not, in fact, good. We are not in a position to understand the deep moral workings of the universe, after all, so how can we be expected to be reliable judges on these matters? It would be rational to withhold judgement, in light of our ignorance and epistemic limitations. But that means we cannot make any moral judgements at all, and that is hardly a desirable outcome and not particularly conducive to virtue.
The problem is worse than this, in fact. If, as sceptical theism has it, everything bad might be for the best, we are presented with a difficult decision when we encounter something that appears to us to be bad and preventable. Should we prevent the bad thing?
What if, for all we know, this bad thing is necessary for some greater good thing, or necessary for the prevention of some even worse thing? It would be very regrettable if we intervened, prevented the bad thing, and thereby caused something even worse.
Perhaps, in preventing this small bad thing, we deny someone the opportunity to develop their virtue. We’d be robbing them of the most valuable thing imaginable! And we certainly don’t want that.
All things considered, perhaps we shouldn’t prevent the bad thing. We are not in a position to understand the deep moral workings of the universe, after all, so how can we be expected to be reliable judges on these matters? We should let it happen, trusting God’s judgement over our own.
But this leads to the absurd situation in which we ought never to prevent anything bad when we can, which is hardly a virtuous attitude.
These are old criticisms and much debated. As I see it, the more significant problem with sceptical theism is what might follow from it for the meaningfulness of our moral judgement.
Meaningful Moral Judgement Needs Limits
For moral judgement to be meaningful, it must have limits: a shape is defined by its edges and boundaries and so a shape must have edges and boundaries.
Sceptical theism, like all unrestrained forms of scepticism, tells us to doubt the most basic certainties we have; and not just some of them, but all of them. It tells us to think the unthinkable. But if I do this then I lose my footing.
I know that child abuse is wrong. I understand that as clearly as I understand the meaning of the terms involved. If child abuse is not-wrong then I no longer understand what ‘wrong’ means. I say it is unjustifiable; I say it is not the kind of thing that can be excused or made-good; I say it is morally impossible, something that categorically ought not to be. This judgement is an edge or a boundary or a cornerstone of my moral judgement; it shapes my moral world; it is a moral necessity.
But sceptical theism asks me to doubt my judgement in this and in all cases, saying: it might be that, sometimes, child abuse is justified. But if I do as I am asked, I lose that cornerstone of my moral judgement and with that the shape of my moral world, the boundaries that determine its meaning, and so I no longer understand what you are asking me to do. To change a moral judgement? But the claim that child abuse is sometimes justified is not something that I would understand to be a moral judgement: it’s wrong to justify child abuse.
You don’t ask me to change my moral judgement but to abandon it entirely and replace it with something else, something I don’t recognise as anything that can be called ‘moral’. You may as well ask me to keep doing ordinary arithmetic on the assumption that one plus one does not equal two.
Read more: The Problem of Evil as an Ethical Problem
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