The Exile: Very nice to meet you, Rion. Am I talking to you at home?
Rion: No, I’m in a hotel just outside of Bullton right now; I’ve been here to give a talk at a conference on mental health.
Ex: And did they have many philosophers talking at the conference?
Ri: Oh for sure, quite a lot, and lots of other writers and YouTubers.
Ex: And how do you think your talk went down?
Ri: It was a sell out! And it was live-streamed; mine had the most hits and likes of all of the talks.
Ex: Congratulations! Presumably it will be put online now?
Ri: It will be watched by millions.
Ex: To be honest, I often envy your profession. You’re always so well-presented, speaking so well and so smoothly. And what’s more, you get to spend all of your time studying and talking about great philosophers; especially Epictetus, who is one of the best examples of a philosopher ever to walk the earth. And of course not only to study and talk, which is one type of thing, but also to understand his teaching, which is another thing entirely and something really to be envied. No philosopher can call themselves a philosopher unless they understand the meaning of great philosophers. Because a philosopher, if they are to do what they do, must understand what it is that they are doing, and so how can they do this if they do not first study and understand philosophy? And all of that knowledge and understanding is very much something to be envied.
Ri: I agree, and understanding these philosophers has been the hardest work for me. But the result is that I can speak better than anyone about Stoicism. My books are the best-selling, my newsletters have the most subscribers, and my YouTube channels too. No one can say they have more success than me in this field.
Ex: I’m glad to hear you say that, since there were some embarrassing gaps in my understanding that I’d hoped you might be able to fix.
Ri: Sure, no problem! But if you were to search on my website you would find I’ve written and spoken about pretty much every topic at some point.
Ex: I’ll have a dig through those some other time, but since I have your ear now I’ll take the opportunity to ask you a question: do you teach any other philosophy, or only Stoicism?
Ri: I stick to Stoicism, for the most part, because it’s the finest of philosophies, a complete and comprehensive system, and more than enough for most people.
Ex: And is there anything about which the Stoics and other philosophies agree?
Ri: Yes, I think so, a lot of Stoic ideas are shared in common with other philosophies.
Ex: And you can explain what the Stoics say about these ideas, and the other philosophies, when they agree?
Ri: Yes, if they agree, then I can explain them equally well, since they’re the same idea.
Ex: But what about matters where they disagree? For example about determinism and free will, or the chief good, where different philosophies will say different things.
Ri: That’s true, they do. There are a lot of disagreements between the ancient schools of thought.
Ex: Who would be able to offer a better explanation of these issues, not only from a Stoic point of view, but from a wider overview of philosophy that extends into many other areas of philosophy: you, or an academic philosopher?
Ri: An academic philosopher would know more about the general history of philosophy than I would.
Ex: And so if you were an academic philosopher then you would be able to offer a good explanation on those points where the Stoics both agree and disagree with other philosophies?
Ri: Sure.
Ex: But how did you come to be able to explain Stoicism, and not also the other philosophical schools of thought? Doesn’t Stoicism talk about the same issues as these other schools? Don’t the Stoics talk about freedom and moral responsibility, the aim in life, the best way to be happy, and about what happiness is, and all the rest? And not only that but also religion and the gods, meaning and language, and the nature of philosophy itself. In short, as a Stoic might say: physics, ethics, and logic. Isn’t that the content of Stoicism?
Ri: It is.
Ex: And other philosophical schools of thought have the same content?
Ri: It’s the same content, but it’s not dealt with in the same way as the Stoics.
Ex: The other philosophies don’t discuss these issues in the same way as the Stoics? What, in a worse way?
Ri: Correct, they are all worse than Stoicism.
Ex: Stoicism is better than these other schools of thought?
Ri: Yes, far, far better.
Ex: But surely when all these schools discuss determinism and free will, for example, where there are a lot of different arguments, but one argument comes out on top, there would be someone who could make a judgement and say ‘this is a good argument because…’, and explain their reasons?
Ri: Sure.
Ex: And that someone who can make that judgement and explanation about the good argument could equally make a judgement and explanation about a bad argument? Because how could they explain if one is better if they can’t also explain how the other is worse.
Ri: Yes, just as well.
Ex: And who would that be, in this case? A metaphysician? Someone who makes it their business to study all the arguments about determinism and free will?
Ri: Sure.
Ex: Ok, and in discussions about the chief good and the ultimate aim in life, where there are many different views, and one view seems to be better than the rest, the individual who can identify the good arguments for this view will be equally adept at identifying the bad?
Ri: Sure, of course.
Ex: And who would that be?
Ri: Someone who specialises in ethics, I suppose.
Ex: And so speaking more generally, whenever philosophers talk about a particular topic but different philosophers have different views, anyone who can identify a good argument ought to be equally adept at identifying a bad one? Because if they can’t identify a bad argument, they could hardly identify the good.
Ri: True.
Ex: The one person must be adept at understanding both the good and the bad arguments on a particular philosophical issue?
Ri: Yes.
Ex: And you would say that the Stoics talk about the same things as the other philosophical schools, such as the Epicureans or Kant or Wittgenstein, although they might talk about these things in a different way, and you say that the Stoic view is better than the others?
Ri: Yes, that’s definitely true.
Ex: And since you can identify the goodness and truth in Stoicism, you could also identify the badness and falsity in the other philosophies?
Ri: I could.
Ex: Then why would you say that an academic philosopher would offer a better explanation of these disagreements?
Ri: I just don’t find other philosophers very interesting. When I hear academic philosophers talking about those other philosophers, I lose interest very quickly and find I have nothing interesting to say. But when they talk about Stoicism I find it very interesting and I am full of ideas; I find I have a lot to say about Stoicism. Why would that be, do you think, other than because Stoicism is the finest philosophy?
Ex: That’s easily explained. No one can fail to see that you talk about Stoicism without any substantial philosophical understanding. If you were able to talk in this way because of your philosophical understanding, you would just as easily be able to talk about other philosophers; because philosophical understanding, if it’s to be more than merely knowing some information, can’t be achieved with a small part but only as a whole.
Ri: …Okay…
Ex: All arts are like this. Would you like me to explain what I mean?
Ri: Go on then, since you obviously know so much more about this than I do; I love to hear academics go on…
Ex: I’m hardly an academic. And if only I did know anything and you could truly call me one who knows! You writers and YouTubers seem to be the ones who know what you’re doing, whereas I am poor and anonymous and pursue only philosophy. I mean, consider what a simple thing I say: that philosophical understanding cannot be achieved by learning only one argument. Isn’t that obvious? If you were going to be a woodworker, you wouldn’t say that you were a good woodworker just because you could make one type of joint, but nothing else? No tables, no chairs, no cabinets, just one joint.
Ri: That’s true.
Ex: And there are good and bad woodworkers, producing good and bad works of wood?
Ri: Yes.
Ex: And could you imagine a woodworker who could appraise just one type of joint, but whenever they encountered a work of wood that didn’t have that particular type of joint they lost interest and had nothing to say?
Ri: That’s hard to imagine.
Ex: Or a music critic who could only take an interest in a song if it were in a particular key? If it’s in D, they will like it or dislike it and have lots to say about the song, but if it’s performed in E they nod off and lose interest?
Ri: That’s also hard to imagine.
Ex: And so no philosopher gets to be a philosopher without knowing and understanding and being interested in philosophy in general?
Ri: I can’t deny what you’re saying, but surely there’s a place for specialism. And I would say that the world agrees with me, since I’m the one they come to if they want to hear about Stoicism. Although I admit that if they want to hear about Wittgenstein or whoever then they should go to someone else. But how can you explain my popularity, if not because I offer such good explanations of Stoicism?
Ex: I can only tell you what I think the reason might be. The gift that you have for speaking excellently about Stoicism is not the product of philosophical understanding but only a knack for speaking that happens to have taken Stoicism for its subject matter. Because if you’re going to talk, you have to talk about something, and the Stoics give you some really good words with which to work. You were at some point struck by the force of those words; you found them inspirational. After that, it’s like magnetism: the force of the words can be transferred into different speakers just as the force of magnetism can be transferred into a chain of iron rings. A very strong magnet will easily attract and attach an iron ring to it, and then that ring will take on some of the magnetic force, but less so. Still, it is enough of an attraction to attach another ring, and so on and so on, forming quite a long chain. The last ring in this chain will still have some magnetic force, but far weaker than the original magnet, since the force is weakened with each link. Philosophy sometimes works a bit like this. Someone has a good insight or idea, a long time ago, and this idea gets captured in words, and these words are passed on down the chain. If we’re lucky, these words survive more or less intact to reach us a long way down the chain, still holding some of their force. But often they are weakened by mistranslation or misinterpretation, or by taking on the spirit of the times through which they pass, or they simply fall out of fashion and are lost along the way. Academics work hard to preserve the words and their meaning, in order to preserve the force of the words, so that it can be passed on without significant loss, but it is a difficult task that requires a lot of discipline and focus. The nature of the task tends to make them lose their minds a bit and meticulously nit-pick about fine technical details, which can get boring and cause people to lose interest. But the academic philosopher remains driven by the spirit of philosophy, which is something that was kindled in them, as Plato says, like a fire born in the soul that, once kindled, immediately nourishes itself and casts a light that makes everything easier to see. This spirit drives them to study more and more philosophy, to learn it and to appraise it, in order to understand it better. Only when they lose themselves in this work do they gain any ability to generate anything new or interesting to pass on down the chain. Which is an interesting irony, when you think about it, that good and interesting ideas tend only to come from dull and tedious work. But without this work, there is nothing from which to generate a really good and interesting idea. Nothing reliable anyway; nothing that can transfer the spirit of philosophy. Because that spirit needs to be carried on in those who embody philosophy, those people we call ‘philosophers’, and so if anyone lacks this spirit then they can hardly be called an embodiment of the subject.
Ri: Yes, I feel like you might be right. All I look to do is pass on the spirit of the Stoics, which I get from their words.
Ex: And you take these words in translation?
Ri: Yes, sometimes from different translations.
Ex: And these translations are the product of academic work?
Ri: Yes, they are.
Ex: And if you’re not sure what something means, you consult an academic book, either recent or older?
Ri: Yes, I do.
Ex: Then you transfer the force of academic philosophy?
Ri: Exactly.
Ex: Tell me this, then: when you give the best presentation of Stoicism, do you do it using your own words or by using the words of the Stoics? Do you do it using some of the more pedantic academic practices like citing historical sources, referring to disagreements in translation, and the like? Would you say that you sometimes lose yourself in these details, at least for a brief time?
Ri: That point hits home, even though I mostly use my own words. Sometimes I do act like an academic, especially when I’m researching a topic.
Ex: And what could we say of an academic who spends years and years researching a very particular topic in great detail, for no obvious purpose beyond that activity: could we say anything other than that they have lost themselves in their work?
Ri: No, that’s the only way you could describe it.
Ex: And are you aware that you must sometimes produce this effect in your viewers and readers? That sometimes they will be prompted to go away and do their own philosophical research, losing themselves in that process?
Ri: Definitely, and that’s something I actively encourage. I want them to go and engage with the Stoics in their original form, by finding and reading the original source material. I think that actively engaging with this source material is a very beneficial part of any Stoic practice.
Ex: Then your viewers and readers are like the last links in a magnetic chain, taking on the force from the origin? You are an intermediate link, between the academic and the audience, and the academic is in turn just another intermediate link in the chain that stretches back to the original idea or insight, with each intermediate link transferring the force of the idea. The original philosopher is the source of this force; and it is philosophy itself, of course, and not merely the representation of it in words, that grants the philosopher their insight. But since there were different philosophers with different insights, there are different forces at work. Some of these forces hit some people more than others. You were clearly hit by Stoicism and inspired by it, and because of this you transfer that force onwards. But you were not hit by the other insights, meaning they have no force for you, which means you cannot transfer that force on. This is why you have no interest in them and why you cannot explain them like you can the Stoics, because your work is not really the product of philosophical understanding but only of the inspirational force that Stoic ideas have for you. In truth it’s little more than your own inspired feeling that you pass on to your audience.
Ri: That’s a nice try, but I doubt you’ll be able to convince me or anyone else that I don’t know what I’m talking about. You only need to hear me speak or read my work to see that you are wrong to speak so disparagingly of me.
Ex: I would very much like to correct my mistake, if I am mistaken. Let’s try another question: what parts of Stoicism do you speak well about? Surely not all the parts.
Ri: There is no part of Stoicism that I don’t speak well about, I assure you.
Ex: But surely not the parts of Stoicism about which you have no understanding?
Ri: And what parts of Stoicism are there that I don’t understand?
Ex: Well, don’t the Stoics sometimes talk in reference to other philosophies, either to compare or contrast, to agree or disagree, to refute or oppose, and all the rest?
Ri: I know about them and can talk about them.
Ex: Tell me, then, what Epictetus says about how most people who call themselves Stoics are really only Peripatetics or Epicureans in disguise, whether they realise it or not.
Ri: That’s where he’s talking about how he’d like to see a Stoic in reality, not just in talk but as someone whose life and character is formed from Stoic principles. It’s one of my favourite passages.
Ex: So here we have three philosophies held alongside one another for comparison: Aristotle’s, Epicurus’s, and Stoicism. Would a woodworker or a philosopher be better able to make any comparisons here?
Ri: A woodworker? The philosopher, obviously.
Ex: And of the many branches of academic philosophical specialism, would a philosopher of science be better placed to make a comparison or a specialist in ancient philosophy?
Ri: The specialist in ancient philosophy would be better able to make the comparison.
Ex: And the reason for this is their knowledge and understanding, or is there another reason?
Ri: No, it’s their knowledge and understanding that makes them able to make any comparisons.
Ex: And every type of knowledge and understanding has its particular application? I mean, you wouldn’t ask this philosopher to advise the woodworker about working wood? Assuming the philosopher has no knowledge or interest in woodworking.
Ri: Of course.
Ex: So learning how to work wood doesn’t equip you to make comparisons between ancient philosophical schools of thought?
Ri: Obviously not.
Ex: And being a contemporary philosopher of science doesn’t either?
Ri: Not really.
Ex: And we’d say that this principle extends across all types of understanding? Let me ask a prior question: you agree that there are different types of understanding?
Ri: Yes, of course.
Ex: And these different types of understanding manifest themselves in different abilities, such as a pilot being able to land a plane, or a woodworker being able to make wooden furniture, or a doctor being able to heal the sick, or a mathematician being able to make calculations, etc., etc.?
Ri: Yes.
Ex: Which must be the case, since if we could all become doctors or pilots only by learning how to work wood, the educational system would be very different. Different types of knowledge and understanding lead to different abilities?
Ri: Yes, obviously.
Ex: This was what I wanted to ask you, whether you think this principle holds universally? That different abilities indicate different types of knowledge and understanding.
Ri: I’d agree with that, in principle.
Ex: Then someone who has no knowledge or understanding in a particular area will not be able to make good judgements about that area, or be particularly capable in any way? Since I don’t know the first thing about flying a plane, you wouldn’t want me landing it, for example; or since I don’t have the first understanding of how to do surgery, you wouldn’t want me operating on you.
Ri: Very true.
Ex: Then who would be better able to make the comparison referred to in those lines of Epictetus: you, or the academic specialist in ancient philosophy?
Ri: The academic, in this case.
Ex: Yes, because you are a Stoic and not an academic.
Ri: Right.
Ex: And the art of the Stoic is different from the art of the academic?
Ri: Definitely.
Ex: And these differences in ability follow from a difference in knowledge and understanding?
Ri: True.
Ex: And when Epictetus talks about the ‘Master Argument’, or about any of the other classic metaphysical disputes of the time, who would be better able to understand what he’s talking about here: you, or the academic metaphysician?
Ri: The metaphysician.
Ex: And when Epictetus talks about Plato or refers to the works of Plato, what knowledge would be necessary to understand these references?
Ri: Knowledge of Plato, presumably.
Ex: And there are many instances in which Epictetus refers to Stoicism and its history: knowledge of Stoicism would be necessary to understand these references?
Ri: Yes, of course.
Ex: Of course. But since you know more about Stoicism than me, could you tell me where in Epictetus I could find him explaining Stoicism?
Ri: All of it is an explanation of Stoicism…
Ex: Not all of it, surely.
Ri: Why? Which parts in a Stoic work aren’t about Stoicism?
Ex: Why, those parts that we’ve just been talking about, like references to Plato and the ‘Master Argument’ and Epicureanism and Aristotelianism.
Ri: Oh I see.
Ex: We agreed that there were different types of knowledge and understanding?
Ri: Yes, yes.
Ex: And that these different types led to different abilities?
Ri: Yes, yes.
Ex: And that no one who lacked knowledge or understanding, or the ability that followed from it, was really in a position to make good judgements about that particular thing?
Ri: Yes, fine.
Ex: And so the Stoic, knowing only Stoicism, won’t necessarily know about other things?
Ri: I wouldn’t bother with certain things.
Ex: You mean you wouldn’t bother with philosophy in general. But if not that, then what would you claim to know?
Ri: I know Stoicism, which is a complete and comprehensive philosophical system and is more than enough for most people. And what I know is enough to enable me to talk about Stoicism better than anyone else.
Ex: Do you mean that you can talk about these references to Plato better than an expert on Plato?
Ri: No, an expert on Plato would know more there.
Ex: Or would you discuss the Master Argument better than a metaphysician?
Ri: No, I wouldn’t claim that.
Ex: But you can teach someone how to be a Stoic?
Ri: Yes, that I can do.
Ex: And suppose this Stoic wants to study Stoicism further, and for the sake of that wants to become an academic who specialises in Stoicism. You could teach them how to do that?
Ri: I could tell them what they need to do to achieve that aim, and how to remain a Stoic as they go about achieving it.
Ex: You could teach them enough to enable them to produce some piece of original work that could get published in one of the top academically peer-reviewed journals?
Ri: No, I wouldn’t say that much.
Ex: Enough to pass a PhD, then?
Ri: No, no…
Ex: A post-graduate degree?
Ri: I’m not sure.
Ex: An undergraduate degree?
Ri: All of that would want more than just Stoicism; I wouldn’t be able to help them with the rest.
Ex: Right, because whilst you have some knowledge of Stoicism, you have no knowledge of the rest. Like a surgeon can perform surgery but wouldn’t be expected to fly a plane. If you were to judge someone’s ability as a surgeon, would you ask them to fly a plane?
Ri: Of course not.
Ex: And to judge a pilot, you’d ask them to perform surgery?
Ri: No.
Ex: And so to judge someone’s ability as a philosopher, would you ask them only about Stoicism?
Ri: I don’t think there’s any problem with that.
Ex: What, so someone who has some knowledge of Stoicism can be judged to be the same as someone who could be called a philosopher?
Ri: Yes, why not?
Ex: And anyone who could be called a philosopher is also a Stoic?
Ri: No, I wouldn’t say that.
Ex: But any Stoic is a philosopher?
Ri: Yes, if they have know enough about it and can apply it, which is within the reach of everyone.
Ex: And you are the best at talking about Stoicism and explaining it to people, both what it means and how it can be applied in their lives?
Ri: Absolutely.
Ex: But then why on earth don’t you take up a professorship, or contribute to the journals, and teach other philosophers?
Ri: I have no interest in being an academic! And besides, they’d have no interest in having me. There are more than enough academics talking endlessly about technical details and achieving nothing. If these academics really know their stuff and so are better able to explain their work, they should talk to the public more.
Ex: But haven’t you heard of Peter Adamson?
Ri: Who is he?
Ex: One who, though an academic, gives some really excellent free philosophy resources to the public. And there are many other academic philosophers doing the same, who all achieved their academic positions in virtue of their ability to participate in and contribute to the academic community, which in turn follows from their knowledge and understanding of philosophy. The academic world will always recognise these contributions, when they are real, and sometimes nowadays even when they aren’t real! Though academic careers that have been achieved with lacks and gaps in understanding tend only to go so far or so long before they either hit a limit or else make themselves look foolish. The peer-review process, corrupted though it may be by the business-oriented character of the modern university, still has some ability to weed out substandard work by a process of natural selection. But if you, Rion, say that no one can speak about Stoicism better than you, what would you have to fear from this process? Wouldn’t they welcome you, and anything you wrote, with open arms? And not just open arms but fanfares and parades! Since in you they’d have one who not only walks the philosopher’s walk but can also talk to the public! Why would you say that you wouldn’t be welcome in the academic community? As I see it there are two possibilities: you say this either because you know that you do not have the knowledge and understanding sufficient to meet the standard of someone who would call themselves a philosopher, which means you have been dishonest with me when you implied that you did, or else you claim no knowledge or understanding for yourself and content yourself with inspiring others towards Stoic philosophy. What you offer is not teaching but only inspiration to go and learn from those who know what they’re talking about. So which is it: are you being dishonest, or inspirational?
Ri: Of those two possibilities, to be inspirational is far nobler.
Ex: Then, Rion, I shall assume the nobler possibility and congratulate you on what you have achieved.
Ri: I expect you’re being ironic. But still, look at what I have achieved. It is far greater than any academic. My books far outsell any academic work, and people the world over come to me to hear me speak about Stoicism; you can hardly say the same about any academic. Besides which, I’ve made much more money by doing what I do than any academic in a university. I’d be stupid to pass up what I have for what they have.
Ex: And a philosopher cares about reward?
Ri: There’s nothing wrong with being rewarded for your work. And so if my work is popular then what’s wrong with that?
Ex: The contrast can’t be between what is popular and what is unpopular, as any philosopher knows. The contrast must be between one who talks without understanding, and one who understands without talking. Which of these better describes the philosopher?
Ri: Ok, ok, you’re getting rhetorical again.
Ex: No, no, I’m not making a point; or at least not the one you think. The question is this: if you are only being inspirational and nothing more, transferring the force of philosophy, as it were, to the public, do you instil this force in others, what might be called the spirit of philosophy, or only your own? What do they get from you? Is it really the spirit of Stoicism, or something else?
Ri: I would say it is the spirit of Stoicism.
Ex: The spirit that is best exemplified in Epictetus? Note that I say Epictetus himself and not the words of Epictetus, which are only a representation.
Ri: I don’t see the difference. How can you pass on the spirit of Epictetus except by passing on his words and ideas?
Ex: Well, what did Epictetus do?
Ri: He taught his Stoic philosophy, which is also what I do.
Ex: And what did Marcus Aurelius do?
Ri: He wrote a journal, which is also what I do!
Ex: And they made a profit from this activity?
Ri: Don’t be childish. We live in the 21st century, in America; or at least I do. There’s nothing wrong with making money.
Ex: Perhaps not. But what did Socrates say about that?
Ri: I don’t know.
Ex: Perhaps we won’t go into it. Let’s just say that money’s fine until it distracts you from what really matters. That, and meden agan. Never mind: it’s not my business. My business, as I see it, is philosophy. I’m not the only one, though we seem to be dwindling. This is not an age for philosophy but only for showmen; and what can you learn from a showman other than how to make a show? Which brings me back to my question: if you are only being inspirational and nothing more, then what you show the public is not really philosophy but something else. The inspirational force that you pass on to them is not really the spirit of philosophy but only your own spirit under the guise of philosophy. These two spirits cannot be the same because they are too different. The spirit of philosophy is kindled in people by their own work, a process that requires questioning and a sincere self-reflection, together with an eagerness to expose one’s errors and any lack of understanding, which tends to show itself as humility and a desire for serious study, the combined effect of which is to produce an uneasy sense in which the more you learn of philosophy, the less you are content to say that you know about it. You end up asking a lot of questions and giving few answers. But your spirit exemplifies none of these characteristics and often shows quite the opposite: you are full of answers and your questions always sound rhetorical. Why is this? Recognising your role as an intermediate link in a chain that connects ancient wisdom with modern lives, you should be struck by a terrible fear that you might be misunderstanding or misrepresenting it: because what could be worse than being responsible for breaking the chain by corrupting these great and noble ideas? This fear would drive you to constantly check yourself and put yourself to the test, to constantly ask yourself whether you really know as much as you think. Because with each new link in the chain, the information gets less accurate, as a magnetic force is weakened, which is why everyone later down the line has to be more disciplined and humble and careful and meticulous. But since we’ve already established that you have little interest in philosophy beyond Stoicism, you are clearly not particularly struck by this fear; this philosopher’s fear, distinctive to their nature, which can only result in a tendency to understand lots and say little. But you, it seems, are content to say lots and understand little.
Ri: I think you’re being very unfair to me. Have you even read my books?
Ex: No, but we are very different people, pursuing very different things. I’ve never eaten grass either, but I don’t need to do so to know that it has no good nutrition for me, even though it might be good for sheep.
Ri: I think I’ve had enough of your opinions and your questions. Let me ask you one: what would you do then, if you were in my position?
Ex: That’s hard to say. Though I would say that I’d ask more questions than I give answers, because I know that I know less than I could. To put it another way, I would know my song well before I start singing. And I would know whether I am in tune before I start playing, because a musician who plays out of tune without realising it is ridiculous. But since I wouldn’t be confident of any of these things, I likely wouldn’t say anything at all.
Ri: Perhaps we can leave each other to our business, then? You saying nothing and doing nothing useful, me inspiring the world to philosophy.
Ex: Would that I could but, again, I cannot let you get away with that claim. Don’t you remember what I just said: that, as far as I’m concerned, you inspire through your own spirit and not the spirit of philosophy?
Ri: Yes, yes, ok: so what of that? Am I to be criticised for being charismatic? What sort of a fault is that?
Ex: That’s not the fault I take issue with. Your talent could provide as great a service to philosophy as the academic, since each preserves an aspect of the chain that enables ancient wisdom to be passed down to us and on to future generations. The question is: what is passed down? Or better: what should be passed down? Not your spirit, I say, since that is yours and not that of Epictetus. You would do philosophy a terrible disservice if you passed one off as the other, as if they were the same. And so the point I take issue with, and cannot allow to pass without challenge, is that philosophy is not what you show it to be. Philosophy is not a show; philosophy is not a game; philosophy is not a business. At times, of course, it slips into participating in these things, such as when we lecture or trade arguments or sell books. But if we stopped at this we would no longer be philosophers but something else entirely: showpeople, game-players, or profiteers. We have a word for this: Sophistry. No serious philosopher can allow themselves to slide into this; not knowingly, anyway, and if they find that they have done so unwittingly then they will turn around and run away as soon as they are able, if they are honest. And yet, you do not seem to run away but only push onwards, carried away on the wings of your own words, driven on by your own momentum and that of your followers. You can do what you like, of course, but there’s a danger you’ll take Epictetus with you, and what a loss to the world that would be.
Ri: But how else can you pass on the spirit of Epictetus without passing on his words and ideas? And what better way to do this than by making them as popular and widely-known as possible?
Ex: That’s a good question, although it’s hardly a new question and not one without ready answers. But to answer it we need to remember what it is that we’re trying to achieve, which is the preservation and furtherance of philosophy. Passing on the inspirational force of philosophy is only a small part of this, but if it is done without the requisite understanding then the force of it will only weaken, like the magnetic force in a chain of iron rings that gets weaker with each link as the distance from the source increases. In this way, philosophy itself becomes weaker and weaker, until eventually its spirit will fade away entirely, or else lie dormant until a new generation jumps back to rekindle an old flame; which has happened before, but has always required great efforts from an individual or collective genius. Since we are blessed to be living in an enlightened time, with all the world’s philosophical resources at our fingertips, the onus is on us to keep this spirit alive and strong. How do we do this? Only by keeping the chain as strong as possible, which means keeping philosophy itself in good health. Which is to say: we need more good philosophers. If each link in the chain becomes not only a receiver of what came before but also a new source of philosophy, then the spirit of philosophy can be preserved undiminished, since its force is replenished and strengthened with each good contribution. But this can only happen by each link in the chain, each speaker of philosophy, being themselves a philosopher: an embodiment of the spirit of philosophy. And this is the problem if you speak without understanding: you do not embody philosophy, you do not do what a philosopher would do, and in that you weaken philosophy itself. So for philosophy’s sake, speak less, or understand more, but don’t continue as you are, because by carrying on like this you are breaking something important. Like those university managers who cut philosophy courses because they are no longer profitable, you are condemning something that you don’t understand. The only difference between those managers and you is that they are at least aware that they are condemning philosophy and don’t claim to be doing it a service.
Ri: I wonder if it’s you who doesn’t understand what I’m doing and not the other way around. Clearly I have done more to raise the awareness and popularity of philosophy than any other philosopher in this time; so what if I profit from it? How can you say this has done philosophy a disservice?
Ex: What did Epictetus do? He wrote nothing, he sold nothing, he claimed nothing. He asked questions, good questions, to the right people; he understood what a good question was and what it was to ask a good question to the right person. Why do you suppose he did this?
Ri: To teach his philosophy.
Ex: Exactly.
Ri: Nothing more to say? What’s your point?
Ex: It’s been said; now it speaks for itself.
This is a work of fiction, written only for recreation and with the best of intentions. No ill will is intended to any person, living or dead, and no attempt has been made to imitate any such person (with the obvious exception of Plato and his characters…), because this is not a true rational account.
‘Since there is so much difference, then, in your desires, your actions, your wishes, would you yet have an equal share with others in those things about which you have not taken pains, and they have? And do you wonder, after all, and are you out of humour if they pity you? But they are not out of humour, if you pity them. Why? Because they are convinced that they are in possession of their proper good; but you are not convinced that you are. Hence you are not contented with your own condition, but desire theirs; whereas they are contented with theirs, and do not desire yours. For if you were really convinced that it is you who are in possession of what is good, and that they are mistaken, you would not so much as think what they say about you.’
Epictetus, Discourses, Book IV, Chapter VI: ‘Concerning those who are annoyed at being pitied’
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